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ABSTRACT
Historic ground combat can be analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitative
analyses of combat are simply historical accounts or case studies. Quantitative analyses,
on the other hand, address the mathematical and statistical aspects of ground combat.
This thesis selects for study one particular quantitati\e methodolog}' called the
Quantified Judgement Method of Analysis, or more simply, the Quantified Judgement
Model (QJVl). The QJM has been used to analyze historic battles and predict future
battle outcomes. However, this thesis focuses solely on describing the QJVI, analyzing
its reasonableness from a military viewpoint, and applying it to historic ground combat.
The QJM consists of two submodels whose interactions represent several battlefield
intangibles such as leadership, morale, and training. The thesis tests the reasonableness
of those submodels and investigates their sensitivity to changes in the model parameters.
Analysis of the model indicates that it is generally sound and reasonable. However,
two equations (Combat Power Ratio and .Ability to Gain or Hold Ground) were found
to be questionable from a military perspecti\e. Further investigations are suggested at
the end.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States has been involved in eight
militan* operations involving the use of militar}' force. These operations are the
Mayaguez Rescue (1975), Iran Rescue Mission (1980), Beirut Peacekeeping Force (1982
- 1984), Grenada Operation (1983), Bekaa Valley Air Raid (1984). F-14 Shootdown of
two Libyan Aircraft (1984), Libyan Air Raid (1986) and Persian Gulf Reflagging
Presence (1987- Present). Of these operations, at least five (Mayaguez, Iran Rescue,
Beirut Peacekeeping, Grenada and Bekaa Valley) have been categorized as either being
poorly planned or executed. For each unsuccessful operation, criticism of U.S. militan.'
operational competence by members of Congress and private organizations (such as the
Militar}' Reform Institute and segments of the media) became louder and more frequent.
By the mid 1980's the issue of "military reform" was gaining increased attention in
governnient, academic, and private circles. In his 1984 book, The Pentagon and the An
of War, the controversial strategist Dr. Edward Luttwak paints a bleak picture of U.S.
militan." operational competence [Ref 1: p. 23]. He states:
The peacetime defects of the military establishment and its failure in war are closely
connected, and the causes of both are best revealed by a review of the painful record
of Vietnam. A reluctance to look back upon defeat is quite normal but also most
dangerous, for it leaves unexamined fatal defects of structure and system that still
endure. Much of what went wrong in Vietnam belonged to the time and place, but
much resulted from military institutions that remain unreformed: and which ftiilcd
again in the Iran raid, Beirut, and Grenada; and which continue to fail in converting
manpower and money into elTective military power.
Are the criticisms levied by Dr. Luttwak valid? Has he and those who share his
views forgotten the human and material costs typically associated with armed conflicts?
Clearly, many Americans expect U.S. military operations to be routinely swift, lethal,
totally successful and with minimal U.S. personnel and equipment losses. But these are
merely expectations and the reality of combat is usually quite different.
This thesis arises from a personal interest in how the U.S. military evaluates its own
and other nations' combat performance. Explorator}' studies have revealed the existence
of numerous techniques or methodologies for analyzing land combat. These
methodologies seem to fall into two major categories. The first categon." encompasses
historical studies which are simply narrative accounts of combat. These accounts are the
standard military historical publications found in libraries and bookstores, and they are
qualitati\e in nature. The second category focuses on analytical techniques which
attempt to quantify armed conflict. These techniques can range from simple statistical
comparisons to highly complex computer simulations of combat models.
Initially, the intent of the thesis was to analyze the U.S. military invasion of
Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury) through one particular methodology in the second
category called the Quantified Judgement Method of Analysis, or more simply, the
Quantified Judgement VIodel (QJM). The objective of the thesis was to see if the QJM
adequately and accurately described Operation Urgent Fury. Additionally, we wanted
to explore the sensitivity of the model to changes in such parameters as number of
weapon systems, terrain, weather, and strength of the enemy.
Since the QJM was published in military Operations Research literature and used
to describe well over 200 historic battles, we assumed the model to be vahd. In other
words, we expected the main QJM equations and factors to be mathematically sound.
We soon found out. however, that our assumption of a flawless model was incorrect.
Eventually, the focus of the thesis shifted from applying the model to an actual battle
(Urgent Fun.) to examining the model solely for reasonableness. Our objective now was
to determine if the QJM equations, submodels, and factors made sense from a military
perspective, and if they did not make sense to explain why and ofler recommendations.
The QJM is used to examine past battles as well as predict future battle outcomes.
However, the thesis focuses exclusively on describing the QJM and applying it to historic
ground combat. The QJM analyzes historic combat and evaluates opponents in terms
of relative combat power and relative combat efiectiveness. It is composed of two
submodels whose interactions manifest such battlefield intangibles as leadership, morale,
training, and so forth. The thesis tests the reasonableness of those models and
investigates their sensitivity to changes in the model parameters.
The thesis is organized into five chapters. Following the Introduction (Chapter 1),
Chapter 2 describes qualitative and quantitative methodologies for analyzing ground
combat. The methodologies are explained and their respective strengths and weaknesses
are cited. Chapters 3 and 4 address the Quantified Judgement Model and its apphcation
to ground combat. The QJM is introduced (development history), defined, and
decomposed. Its submodels are analyzed through numerous examples to increase
understanding of the model, to provide insight into combat dynamics, and to test the
reasonableness of the submodels. The objective of these chapters is to determine if the
QJM is reasonable and if it adequately and accurately portrays ground combat. The
final chapter (Chapter 5) summarizes the thesis and suggests areas of the QJM requiring
further study.
II. ANALYZING LAND COMBAT: QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGIES
A. INTRODUCTION
Can meaningful lessons be drawn from studying past wars? If so. can those lessons
be applied to present day military forces to ensure a greater likelihood of success on the
battlefield? This chapter presents a brief overview of methodologies used by militar}' and
civilian analysts in reaching fairh' accurate and useful conclusions about war.
The history of humankind is replete with examples in which superior military forces
have defeated, or been defeated by, supposedly inferior opponents. The U.S. invasion
of Grenada in order to rescue U.S. citizens and neutralize a hostile government is an
example of a superior force defeating its opponent. Certainly the massive array of
militar}' forces available to U.S. planners against a relatively small Cuban force
guaranteed success. On the other hand, Soviet forces in Afghanistan, clearly possessing
superiority in firepower, mobility, and trained personnel over their opponents the
Mujahidin, are no closer to a military solution than they were in 1980. The American
experience in Southeast Asia provides a close parallel to the present Soviet situation in
Afghanistan.
What can be learned from studying war and how can the findings be applied to
military forces? For centuries, military historians and strategists have grappled with this
issue. Some, such as ( lausewitz. have developed their theories on war from studying
modern history [Ref 2]. Others have focused their analysis on specific aspects of a
military campaign (such as, tactics, logistics, and mobility). Since World War II, the
military analyst has increasingly exploited computers and mathematical techniques to
identify and dissect the components of warfare. The results of these analyses of past
wars, whether arising from either historical analyses, case studies, computer simulations,
or mathematical relationships, are commonly referred to as lessons. But what exactly is
a military lesson? Do we study a specific conflict and then select that particular strategy,
tactic, or piece of equipment which appeared pivotal in the battle's outcome? Likewise,
once we have identified that variable, can we infer that its proper application in a future
war will ensure victory?
The goal of this chapter is not to present a checklist for finding military lessons, but
to explore methodologies that have been used in analyzing war.
B. QUALITATIVE ANALYSES: HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS AND CASE
STUDIES
Throughout recorded history, past wars have been studied in order to see how to
gain an advantage over an opponent. Given the technological nature of modern society,
are the analyses of past wars really of any value in developing more effective combat
forces? Can new doctrine, strategy, and tactics be validated by examining previous wars?
Or must we simply rely on actual present or future combat to establish their validity?
There exists a voluminous body of work on many great generals (such as Alexander.
Hannibal. Caesar, and Napoleon) and their campaigns. Certainly any militar\" person
or historian can learn about grand strategy, leadership, and innovation from these
masters. Yet, a direct application of the ideas of these masters to the present day. in
terms of pure strategy and tactics, is tenuous. More likely, it is the wars of recent history
which may have the most to tell us. In the context of this discussion, recent shall mean
from World War II to the present. For the most part, recent wars are still closely linked
to the present by political, strategic, tactical, and technological channels. Napoleon.
knowing that his own officers lacked knowledge concerning wars recent to his times once
remarked, "All of our young men find it easier to learn about the Punic Wars than the
War of the American Revolution. "[Ref 3: p. 57]
By comparison, following W^orld War I the German Army closely exainined its
performance during that war to seek improvements in its doctrine and training [Ref. 3:
p. 63]. Initial German successes in W'orld War II can be attributed to a General Stall
which provided the structure and leadership to implement strategically what had been
learned from the W'orld War 1 combat lessons.
If meaningful lessons are to be learned from studying past wars, how does the
militar\' analyst or historian uncover them? In the first place, each analyst has his or
her own experience level, coupled with personal and professional biases. For instance,
an infantry oOlcer may draw quite difierent conclusions from examining a battle site
than would a combat engineer. It is important for each analyst to see and acknowledge
that he or she views the world according to personal experiences and biases. That is,
each person has a particular and unique frame of reference. As history shows, bias
(whether institutional or personal) often contributes to the disregard and
underestimation of an opponent. In 1939, the French High Command discounted
Germany's efiectiveness in driving through Poland and held firmly to the belief that what
occurred there could not happen in France because, "We are not Poles." [Ref 3: p. 64]
More recently, Halberstam [Ref. 4] portrays Lyndon Johnson and his advisors as grossly
underestimating both North Vietnam's conimitment to fight, and its eirectiveness as a
military force, early on in the Vietnam conflict.
Another way combat lessons sometimes go undetected is when a tunnel vision effect
occurs on doctrine. As an illustration, note that most conflicts in the last 15 to 20 years
have been of low intensity and have occurred in the Third World. If increasing low
intensity warfare is indeed a trend, then gross overemphasis on conventional warfighting
doctrine (in a European scenario) may be unjustified. The military analyst must not
allow his particular service doctrine (e.g., U.S. Army: Airland, L'SMC: Amphibious) to
act as bhnders to warfare trends. Without question, doctrine is paramount to today's
modern armies. It shapes force structure and defines budgetary requirements.
Nevertheless, it can stifle the generation and promulgation of new ideas. After World
War I, the French were so enamored of their defensive doctrine that they failed to heed
dramatic German successes in Poland in 1939. As shown by history, doctrine should
never drive the scope and substance of military lessons to be learned. Rather, sound and
unbiased analyses of past wars, and their associated lessons, should drive the evolution
of doctrine. The reality that doctrine has determined which lessons to draw is illustrated
by this excerpt [Ref 5: pp. 338-343] from the British Oflk^al History of the
Russo-Japanese War:
If the comments in the Ofllcial History are to have any value for the Army, they
must be in consonance with the doctrine of war which the General Stafl'is teaching.
Besides e.xcessive rehance on doctrine, valuable combat lessons may also go
unheeded when military analysts observers are overdirected in the areas from which to
seek lessons. Military analysts observers are most effective when they are free to
observe and question any important aspect of the war, according to their experience and
judgement.
If we assume that an unbiased analysis has been conducted on a recent war and that
valuable lessons have been obtained, how can that information be translated into
improved combat eflectiveness? Granted, the combat analysis itself has yielded
important lessons, but they are valueless unless converted into the currency of wartime
eflectiveness. To illuminate this idea, note the case of Military After Action Reports.
These reports are produced at the conclusion of exercises and operations, and generally
contain a section on lessons learned. Over time, After Action Reports accumulate in the
files and safes at higher headquarters, often not reviewed until just prior to the next
iteration of the exercise, or when periodic crises erupt in a particular country. The mere
production and aggregation of lists of lessons learned provide little, if any. benefit to
combat forces. To be of value, a mechanism must be m place to take those lessons,
conduct analyses and integration of them, and translate them into elTective action.
Finally, the lessons learned must be disseminated down to the fighting forces in the
forms of doctrine and training.
Most mihtary men acknowledge that there is no better way to develop combat
proficiency than through personal combat experience. However, combat experience is
a commodity in short supply for the armed forces during prolonged periods of peace.
As a result, the development of doctrine and training from studying the lessons of recent
wars and potential adversaries yields the next best means of improving combat
effectiveness. As early as 1966, the U.S. Army required commanders to include a
section on lessons learned in combat in their After Action Reports [Ref. 6]. From what
is now known about the outcome of the Vietnam War, the question must be raised as
to why our lessons learned were not more decisive in determining the outcome of the
war. Did political and military institutions, as well as their huge bureaucracies, prevent
the implementation of the appropriate lessons? Or were decisions makers operating
under a fiawed set of assumptions concerning our opponent?
Nongovernment organizations, such as R.A.ND or other research groups, are equally
vulnerable to reaching faulty conclusions from the study of war. However, the causes
of flawed analysis in the private sector seem to stem from other factors. Private
organizations are frequently constrained to publish studies in an unclassified form.
Consequently, they depend on unclassified and second-hand sources of information.
The scarcity of accurate unclassified combat data, combined with the possibility of
misinformation, may lead to analysis of questionable accuracy and depth. The MihtaiT
Reform Institutes, Grenada Operaiion Report of 5 April 1984, reviewed five major
aspects of the operation and was given substantial coverage by the media. The Report's
total length was a mere four and one-half pages; clearing raising a question of analytical
depth and thoroughness.
Historically, it seems clear that successful military forces do act upon their lessons
learned. Moreover, military structure and bureaucracy are not so rigid as to suppress
original ideas. The historical analysis of recent wars, military operations, and exercises
can provide a means to improve combat elTectiveness through the development of
appropriate doctrine, strategy, or tactics. Quite likely, the thorough analysis of one
conflict is preferable to a shallow study of several conflicts, each touched upon only
briefly. In the words of Clausewitz [Ref 2: p. 173],
Where a new or debatable point of view is concerned, a single thoroughly detailed
event is more instructive than ten only touched upon.
If several distinct conflicts are to be studied, then caution should be exercised in
making across-the-board comparisons. Each war or battle is unique in the way its
variables (e.g., opposing forces, terrain, weather, leadership, morale, etc.) interact to
produce the final outcome. Attempted linkage of different wars' lessons is risky.
Additionally, estabhshed doctrine should not constrain the conclusions of the analysis.
Meaningful lessons of war stand on their own merits and need not be supported by
doctrine to justify their validity.
The modern miUtary historian Luvaas [Ref 3: p. 69] asserts that historical analysis
should seek understanding and not pat answers;
Insights gained would be a more appropriate concept. Frederick The Great,
Napoleon, and Clausewitz would clearly have understood that. Their observations,
albeit in a far simpler world, led in most instances to profound understanding, and
that is precisely the dimension lacking in our current approach to many situations.
C. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES
In the previous section, the approaches of historical analyses and case studies were
examined as potential descriptive methodologies for evaluating war. This section focuses
on drawing militan.' lessons from quantitative analyses.
To establish a framework for discussion, it is desirable to separate warfare
quantitative analyses into macrolevel and microlevel categories, i Of the two categories,
the macrolevel is the most straightforward and least controversial. By examining recent
wars at the macrolevel. a military analyst establishes a baseline on which to build the
analysis. For instance, the media, poUticians and elected oflicials routinely state that the
world is becoming increasingly dangerous. In an attempt to address this assumption, the
following macrolevel analysis from the Journal of Peace Research is offered [Ref 3: p.
43]:
1 HarkavT in (Ref. 3: p. 5] discusses conceptual and methodological issues in studying war and
introduces the terms macrolevel and microlevel.
TIME PERIOD AVERAGE NUMBER OF ARMED CONFLICTS
1945 - 1948 6. 3
1949 - 1952 6. 6
1953 - 1956 8. 3
1957 - 1960 9. 6
1961 - 1964 13. 3
1965 - 1968 20. 1
1969 - 1972 17. 1
1973 - 1976 11. 1
Figure 1. Average Number of Armed Conllicts per Year
Though the data ends with the period 1973-1976, we observe that there is a trend in
the number of wars over time, but not necessarily an increasing one. It would be
interesting to see what the numbers look like from 1977 onward, and if any further
insights could be gained. This category of analysis does a superb job of taking an
ill-defined assumption (such as. the world is increasingly dangerous) and making it more
clearly defined. Most importantly, analysis of this type may actually disprove underlying
initial assumptions.
One question to raise concerning the data in Figure 1 is the definition of armed
conjlici. Conventional interstate wars such as Iran-Iraq and the Falklands are bonifide
armed conflicts, but insurgencies in Sri Lanka and Angola are less easily classilied.
Furthermore, how small does an armed conflict have to be before it is viewed as just a
police action or random act of violence (and not a war at all). In other words, strict
definitions must be made and adhered to in macrolevel analysis. Precise definitions
allow both the analyst and the recipient of the analysis to adhere to a common frame
of reference, reach common conclusions, and thus communicate more effectively.
A second example of macrolevel analysis is provided in Figure 2, where terrorist
incidents are categorized according to time frame and geographic region [Ref 3: p. 45].
GEOGRAPHIC REGION NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
Atlantic Community 572
Middle East 159
Asia 102
East Europe 8
Latin America 282
Africa 37
Figure 2. Distribution of Terrorist Incidents, 1968 - 1975
Figure 2 provides a concise breakdown of terrorist incidents worldwide. The analysis
reveals that most terrorist incidents in the eight year span occurred in the Atlantic
Community and Latin America. Again, the data raises at least two interesting questions.
1. How is the term lerrorisi incideiii defined ? A precise definition of terrorist incident
in terms of the analysis removes any doubt as to how incidents are defined.
2. What are the sources o^ information used to derive the analysis ? Open societies
are more apt to report terrorist incidents than communist regimes and
dictatorships. Therefore, the data may not reflect real events.
Do macrolevel analyses yield valuable militar>' lessons? Can knowledge of the trends
in recent warfare benefit those v,ho make decisions regarding U.S. military force
structure? Obviously the armed forces of a nation should be developed and maintained
to handle efiectively the range of potential threats which it must face. So if macrolevel
analysis of recent wars points to an increase in Third World revolutionary war. then we
should acknowledge that fact when we create forces and doctrine. Failure to study
trends in warfare, combined with a view that wars which we are unaccustomed to
fighting are somehow less significant, may yield ineffective results on the battlefield. As
the French and Americans both found out in Indochina (and as the Soviets have found
in Afghanistan), the types of warfare which countries are ill-prepared to wage possess
valuable lessons to be studied. Of course major powers, by nature of their worldwide
commitments, are unable to focus exclusively on small conflicts. As the French,
Americans, and Soviets found out, their opponents had the luxur\- of total commitment
to the conflict while thev did not.
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The above discussion on French. American, and Soviet combat experience
demonstrates win- a clear understanding of worldwide trends in armed conilict b}' top
military and go\ernment leaders is critical to ensuring that U.S. force structure and
doctrine reflects today's military challenges and political realities.
Macrolevel analyses illuminate trends in warfare, whereas microlevel analyses focus
on specific combat scenarios. Microlevel analyses are more diftlcult to produce than
those at the macrolevel, and often their conclusions are more difficult to interpret.
However, the numerous commitments which U.S. military forces must uphold, and their
associated range of responses, mandate that potential combat scenarios and proposed
weapon systems be studied extensively.
The realm of technical microlevel combat analysis is relegated to professional
military and civilian Operations Research analysts. These analysts have at their disposal
a myriad of analytical resources. Even with such an impressive inventory of computing
tools, analysts can neither predict future battle outcomes with absolute certainty nor
simulate past battles exactly the way they actually occurred. Yet, microlevel analyses
still represent one of the most powerful approaches to evaluating combat lessons.
For instance, comp iter simulations of a piece of military hardware (e.g.. flight of a
tank round) can often be as accurate, and even cheaper, than actual field tests. At lower
levels of resolution, combat engagements, up to the battalion level, are frequently
simulated to examine the effects of weapon performance and tactics. As a computer
simulation becomes more complex (by either certain probabihstic factors or the inclusion
of additional input variables) it generally becomes more diflicult to validate the results
or conclusions. In some simulations, validation can be achieved by making comparisons
between historical combat results or actual field data. However, all complex aggregated
simulations (such as, determining the winning side in a theater level war) are difficult to
validate.
There are specific variables of war which are diflicult or impossible to measure yet
have a decisive aflect on battle outcomes. Three of these variables are leadership,
training, and morale. Operations Researchers are presently divided on whether variables
of this type should be included in their analyses. Furthermore, if a consensus is reached
on incorporating these intangibles, the question still remains as to how to best represent
them. Such terms as well trained and completely surprised are usually ill-defined and
highly individualized judgements. Nevertheless, research does continue on the
n
incorporation and quantification of these difficult to measure, but highly important,
variables of war.
Quantitative methodologies can be applied to uncover lessons in past wars or to test
lessons in future wartime scenarios. On the macrolevel, trends in the type, duration
frequency, and location of wars can be discovered and used to our advantage.
Macrolevel analyses often require only the most basic mathematical skill to apply. On
the other hand, real skill is required in asking the right pertinent questions and in
adhering to estabhshed definitions. Trends in warfare do actually occur, and they must
be made known to top level decision makers.
Detailed or microlevel analyses of strategy, tactics, and weapons can be performed
by computer simulations or through mathematical models such as the Lanchester
differential equations. The interpretations and conclusions of these analyses are
typically highly specific (such as, the average number of enemy casualties or tank rounds
expended). It is important to realize that it is usually impossible for a simulation to
include every variable of a past or (hypothetical) future battle. Nevertheless, computer
simulations and mathematical models are important analytical tools. Individual
hardware performance can be simulated rather effectively. Battalion and lower level
engagements with representations of terrain, mobility, target detection and weapon
effects can be simulated, and the computer programs run repeatedly in order to obtain
reliable output values. Macro and microlevel quantitative analyses can be valuable tools
for revealing some of the hidden lessons of war.
D. SUMMARY
Warfare can be studied from both historical and analytical standpoints. Each
vantage has the potent: al to yield select combat lessons which, if properly exploited,
promise to enhance combat performance.
Historical analyses are not a panacea for battlefield success because the issue of
historical analysis centers on prudency. Richard Betts in Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold
JVar Crises writes:
Trying to use the lessons of the past correctly poses two dilemmas. One is a
problem of balance: knowing how much to rely on the past as a guide and how
much to ignore it. The other is a problem of selection: certain lessons drawn from
experience contradict others.
For this reason, superior combat forces have been those best able to achieve this balance
by selectively drawing lessons from their own and other's combat experiences. Likewise,
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excellence in exploiting combat lessons does not imply the exclusive study of positive
lessons; that is, the actions taken by the victorious force. Positive lessons o[ past
campaigns do not guarantee present day victory. Frederick the Great of Prussia learned
in his first battle not to rely on a tactic or strategy simply because it worked somewhere
else. According to Luvaas [Ref 3: p. 56},
Frederick had endeavored to offset his own inferiority in cavalry by placing two
battalions of grenadiers between the cavalry squadrons of each wing. "This was the
disposition made by Gustavus Adolphus at the battle of Lutzen," he
explained... noting that "according to all appearances," this particular tactic "will
never more be practiced."
Quite possibly, the negative lessons of war (that is, the actions taken by the defeated
force) may be more instructive. Frequently, it is the defeat in battle which causes a strict
examination of the factors which led to that defeat. The huge amount of literature on
the Vietnam War can likely be attributed to our unsuccessful efforts there [Ref 7 : pp.
19-31]. Self examination of combat failures, has been shown to contribute to improved
performance in a future war. Following World War I, the Germans anahzed then-
wartime performance and took subsequent action to improve military doctrine and
training. Their early successes in World War II demonstrated the degree to \\'hich they
had assimilated the lessons from their World War I experiences.
In searching out combat lessons military analysts must not allow personal and
professional biases to prejudice their findings. Viewing the battlefield environment
through the frame of a rigid doctrine allows many crucial lessons to slip past scrutiny.
Combat lessons should themselves drive the examination of existing doctrine or the
development of new doctrine. Useful combat lessons can then be conserted to some
coherent part of doctrine. An implementation process, unhampered by bureaucratic
entropy, then needs to be in place to analyze, integrate, and disseminate the lessons
learned to combat forces by way of appropriate doctrine and training. As the combat
environment becomes more sophisticated and competitive, the successful military
organizations will be able to exploit rapidly the combat lessons of past battles.
Quantitative analyses of war difler from historical analyses by focusing on the
mathematical and statistical aspects of the conflicts. Quantitative analyses can be simple
or complex; the number of ongoing wars in a particular region is simple compared to the
complexity of a computer simulation of theater-level war. In any case, quantitative
analyses provide a wide range of information and insight into war. Quantitative
measures are capable of identifying trends in war, providing test criteria of weapon
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systems according to established tactics, training personnel under simulated combat
conditions, and validating combat lessons under various wartime scenarios. The fact
that simplifying assumptions are incorporated into every quantitative analysis, as well
as the acknowledgement that even.- factor cannot be accounted for in the model,
underscores the realization that analyses of this type are not absolutely correct. They
are approximations to reality. Nevertheless, if used selectively and intelligently,
quantitative methods can contribute to improved force effectiveness.
Are quahtative and quantitative analyses equally proficient methods to identifying
combat lessons, or is one approach superior to the other? There is no simple answer to
this question. However, knowledge of, and exposure to. both methodologies enable an
analyst to be more resourceful and eflective in studying war. The ability of the military
analyst to bring both methodologies to bear on the study of a past conflict unequivocally
contributes to sounder analysis. The challenge lies in convincing both military analysts
and combat leaders that the study of war is neither easy nor simply a matter of
compiling checklists. It is by applying the select lessoiis of history and precise analytical
skills that the true nature of combat can be revealed.
In the next three chapters, a specific method of analysis known as the Quantified
Judgement Model, is presented. The Quantified Judgement Model will be described and
analyzed in the context of exploring historic ground combat. The objective of the
ensuing three chapters is to determine if the model is reasonable and if it accurately and
adequately represents historic ground combat.
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III. HISTORICAL GROUND COMBAT AND THE QLANTIFIED
JUDGEMENT MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, various methodologies for analyzing land combat were
explored. In this chapter, the Quantified Judgement Model (QJM) is introduced,
described, and illuminated through examples. The goal of the chapter is to determine if
the model is reasonable and the extent to which it adequately and accurately represents
historical ground combat. Though the QJM may be used to predict future battle
outcomes, the next two chapters focus exclusively on historical combat and the QJM.
The QJM was developed by Col. T.N. Dupuy U.S. Army. Ret. in association with
colleagues from the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization. Dupuy. an
eminent mihtary historian, has taken Clausewitz's masterwork On War and applied
analytical and mathematical refinement to Clausewitz's theory. Dupuy cites passages in
Book Three. Chapter S of On War and terms them "Clausewitz's Law of Numbers."
He postulates that this "Law of Numbers" represents an expression equating the combat
power of a force to be the product of the number of its troops times an environmentaf
operational factor times a quality of troops factor (Figure 3).
In the 150 years since Clausewitz's death, weapons have changed radically in terms
of lethality, range, means of deliveiw and mobility. To account for weapon evolution.
Dupuy replaces the number of troops factor v/ith force strength and defines it as a
force's total inventory in weapons (number and type) and personnel. His interpretation
of Clausewitz's theory is represented mathematically in the following figure.
2
2 Notational diilerences exist between the thesis and [Refs. 8, 9]. For instance, Dupuy defines
operational, environmental factors with V whereas the thesis uses the symbol OF. Notational
changes are used to reflect better the meaning of the terms to enhance the understanding by the
reader.
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P=SxOExQ
where:
P = combat power of the force
S = force strength (number and type of weapons plus personnel)
OE = operational en\ironmental factors
Q= quality of troops
Figure 3. Combat Po\\er Equation
Notice that combat power (?) is equal to the product of three factors. Why are the
factors multipUed and not added? Clausewitz's writings suggest that combat power (?)
is proportional to force strength (S) [Ref. 8: p. 28J. If this is the case, then the
proportionality factor may be interpreted as the constant OE x 0. As either factor (OE
or Q) decreases, so does combat power even though the force strength (S) itself remains
constant. Likewise, if either factor increases (and S remains constant), the combat power
increases. Of course a reduction in S also reduces ?.
The combat power factors S, OE, and Q are derived from equations introduced and
described in Chapter 4. Figure 4 provides value (real or integer) and approximate range
data for the factors.
3
FACTOR VALUE APPROXIMATE RANGE
S (force strength) real 500 to 500,000
OE (operational/environmental) real 0.25 to 4.0
Q (troop quality) real 0.20 to 5.0
Figure 4. Range of Combat Power Factors
Dupuy reasons that if the combat power of a single force can be computed, then
similar calculations can be performed for two forces engaged in combat. Moreover, a
relative combat power of opposing forces may be calculated by taking a ratio of the
3 The ranee of values for S. OE, and Q in Figure 4 are hishlv approximate and obtained from
(Ref 8: pp. 82>3| and (Ref. 9: pp. 228-230.234-239]. Theoretically, force strength (S) can range
from zero to infuiitv. However. Fisure 4 uses arbitrar\' S values of 500 to 500,000.
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forces' combat power values. That is, ifPib) is the combat power of the blue force, and
P(r) the combat power of the red force, then the ratio P(b) P(r) represents the relative
combat power of the blue force to the red force. This ratio is designated the Combat
Power Ratio. The following three examples illustrate the utility of the combat power
ratio for opposing red and blue forces.
Example 1
FACTOR
Force Strength (S)
Operational/Environmental (OE)
Troop Quality (Q)
The Combat Power Ratios are:
P(r) 1000 X 1. X 5.
RED FORCE BLUE FORCE
1000 500
1.0 1.
5.0 5.
P(b) 500 X 1. X 5.
and
P{b) 500 X 1. X 5.
= 2
P(r) 1000 X 1. X 5.
Discussion: Both forces are evenly matched in operational and
environmental and troop quality factors. However, the Red force
possesses twice the force strength as blue resulting in a combat
power advantage for the red side.
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Example
_2
FACTOR RED FORCE BLUE FORCE
S 1000 500
OE 1. 1.
Q 1.0 3.0
The Combat Power Ratios are:
Pir) 1000 X 1. X 1.
P(b) 500 X 1.0 X 3.0
and
Pit) 500 X 1. X 3.
= .666
P[r) 1000 X 1. X 1.
= 1.5
Discussion: The operational/environmental factors for each side
are identical. Therefore, these factors do not contribute to a
combat power advantage for either side. Though the red force
commands a two to one strength edge, we see that the blue
force's troop quality advantage is even greater. Taking these
factors into consideration, overall red force combat power
is less than that of the blue force. Clearly, the superior
quality of blue troops offsets the strength superiority of
the red force.
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Example
_3
FACTOR RED FORCE BLUE FORCE
S 1500 500
OE 1. 2.5
Q 2.0 1.5
The Combat Power Ratios are:
P(r) 1500 X 1. X 2.
P{b) 500 X 2.5 X 1.5
and
Pit) 500 X 250 X 150
1.6
P{r} 1500 X 100 X 200
=
. 625
Discussion: In this example, a vastly superior red force attacks a
blue force established in defensive positions. Because of its defensive
posture, the blue force maintains a powerful advantage in operational
and environmental factors. However, the red force is both superbly
trained and well lead; two ingredients which contribute to its high
troop quality value. Taking all three factors into consideration,
the red force is more combat powerful than its blue adversary.
The preceding examples illustrate the employment and meaning of the QJM combat
power ratio. In Chapter 4, an examination is made of how the QJM assigns values to
force strength (S). operational environmental factors (OE), and troop quality (Q).
Dupuy's efforts to lend quantitative weight to Clausewitz's theon,' led to the
formulation of a Combat Power equation to compute a force's historical combat power.
To compare the equation's results to actual histor\', Dupuy employs a second equation
which quantifies historical battle outcomes. This equation asserts that a forces outcome
in battle is equal to the sum of three factors: mission accompUshment, ability to gain
or hold ground, and force effectiveness when casualties are incurred. Stated
mathematically, the equation is expressed as:
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R = M+G+ C
where:
R = battle results of the force
M = mission accomplishment
G = ability to gain or hold ground
C = effectiveness when casualties are incurred
Figure 5. Actual Battle Results Equation
Unlike the Combat Power equation, the Actual Battle Results equation consists of
three terms added together. Why does the QJM sum the terms M. G, and C? A possible
explanation is that if one of the terms is small, say effectiveness when casualties occur
C, the value of R can still be significant ifM and G compensate enough for the smallness
of C. The terms M, G, and C are also dimensionless quantities, which will be seen later
in the thesis.
The factors G and C are derived from equations introduced and described in
Chapter 4. Mission accomphshment (M) values are obtained from Figure 22 in Chapter
4. The actual battle results factors (R. M, G, and C) occur in the following values and
approximate ranges:-!
FACTOR VALUE APPROXIMATE RAiNGE
R (actual battle results) real -5.5 to 16.5
M (mission accomplishment) integer 1 to 10
G (ability to gain or hold ground) real -3. to 3.
C (casualty effectiveness) real -3. 5 to 3.5
Figure 6. Range of Actual Battle Results Factors
Actual battle results for opposing forces in historic combat are calculated
individually using the equation R = M + G + C . The values for two opposing forces are
4 The range of values for R. G, and C in Figure 6 are only approximate and were generously
provided by T. N. Dupuy in a private communication.
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expressed as a ratio R(h) R(r) which Dupuy designates the Results Ratio. The operation
of the results ratio is demonstrated in the ensuing two examples.
Example 4
FACTOR
Mission Accomplishment (M)
Ability to Gain or Hold Ground (G)
Effectiveness when Casualties are Incurred (C)
The Results Ratios are:
Rir) 8 + 2. + 1.
RED FORCE BLUE FORCE
8 2
2. 1.0
;) 1.0 1.5
Rib) 2+1.0+1.5
and
R(b) 2 + 1. + 1. 5
= 2.44
R{r) 8 + 2. + 1.
= .41
Discussion: The red force was overwhelmingly successful in executing
its mission, while the blue force was not. Furthermore, it was twice
as successful as blue in gaining or holding ground. Though the blue
force was more effective in fighting with casualties, this advantage
could not offset the red force's superiority in the two other factors.
For this battle, the red force was the clear winner.
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Example
_5
FACTOR RED FORCE BLUE FORCE
M 5 5
G 3.0 1.
C 1.5 2.0
The Results Ratios are:
Rin 5 + 3.0+1.5
R(b) 5 + 1. + 2.
and
Rib) 5 + 1.0 + 2.0
= 1. 19
Rin 5 + 3. + 1.5
= .8h+
Discussion: In this example, each force accomplished its assigned
mission in a less than satisfactory manner. However, the red force
was far more capable than blue in either gaining or holding ground,
even though blue was slightly more efficient in operating with
casualties. Taking all three factors into account, the results
ratio indicates that the red force won.
Later in the thesis, we explore how the QJM assigns values to mission
accomplishment (M), ability to gain or hold ground (G), and elTectiveness when
casualties are incurred (C).
1. Section Summan
The QJM employs two separate submodels to evaluate historic ground combat.
The Combat Power equation yields a force's historical combat power and is used to
obtain a combat power ratio for opposing forces. The Actual Battle Results equation
calculates how well an individual force performed in combat and is used to compute a
results ratio for opposing forces. In Section B, the combat power and results ratios are
used to obtain an expression for a force's combat effectiveness. The combat
efiectiveness expression is analyzed both for reasonableness and for its potential in
providing insight into ground combat.
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B. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Recall that the Quantified Judgement Model uses two submodels to evaluate
historic cround combat:
Combat Po^ver Equation: P = S x OE x Q
where:
P = combat power of the force
S = force strength (number and type of weapons plus personnel)
OE = operational environmental factors
Q = quality of troops
and
Actual Battle Results Equation: R=M+G+C
where:
R = battle results of the force
M = mission accomplishnient
G = ability to gain or hold ground
C = effectiveness when casualties are incurred
Figure 7. QJISI Submodels
In analyzing opposing forces relative to one another, the models are used to give
ratios. Using the example of blue (b) and red (r) adversaries the ratios are:
P{h)
Combat PoA\er Ratio =
P[r)
and
Rib)
Results Ratio
R{r)
Figure 8. Combat Po>^er and Results Ratios
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These ratios allow historical combat to be analyzed both descriptively and
theoretically. As discussed, the resulis ratio describes historical battle outcomes and can
be thought of as a report card which grades opponents in terms of mission
accomplishment, ability to gain or hold ground, and elTectiveness when casuaUties are
incurred. To evaluate the engagement theoretically, QJVI's developers redefme the
combat power ratio, omitting each sides troop quality (Q) term , to depict theoretical
battle outcomes. Put more simply, theoretical outcomes reflect a victor's superiority in
numbers of personnel, weapons, and operational/environmental factors. This
relationship, termed Theoretical Combat Power {P'), is defined as follows:
Theoretical Combat Power (PO P' = SxOE
Using blue and red forces, if R(b) and R(r) represent actual battle results and P(b)
and P(r) theoretical combat power sans respective troop quahty factors, then we define:
P'(b)
Theoretical Combat Poner Ratio =
P'ir)
and
Actual Battle Results Ratio =
Rib)
R{r)
Figure 9. Theoretical Combat Power and Actual Battle Results Ratios
In the preceding discussion, troop quality (Q) is noticeably absent in the theoretical
combat power ratio. This omission is explained on the basis that the components of
troop quality (leadership, morale, training, and chance, luck) are not directly measurable.
However, battle outcomes are traditionally influenced by human factors. Therefore,
some direct or indirect representation of these factors in combat models is both
necessar}' and logical. For QJVI to have miHtar\- value, troop quality or, in a larger
sense, unit combat eflectiveness must be considered. This idea is discussed in the next
subsection.
1. Determining Combat Effectiveness (CE)
Dupuy estimates troop quality or combat eflectiveness by equating it to the
actual battle results ratio divided by the theoretical combat power ratio. Smce it is more
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descriptive, the term Combat Effectiveness (CE) is used in lieu of Troop Quality (Q).
Svmbolicallv. combat elTectiveness (CE) is defined bv:
Rib)
Combat Effectiveness (blue force): ->*)=^- Rib) P'ir)
_
R{r) " P'{b)
P'{r)
Rir)
Combat Effectiveness (red force): -"^=^=
R{r) P'ib) -|
R{b) " P'ir)
P'{b)
Figure 10. Combat Effectiveness Equation
a. Reasonableness of the Combat Effectiveness Equation
Combat elTectiveness (CE) in the QJM is intended to represent human
characteristics such as leadership, morale, training, experience, and luck chance. In
order for a military force to comrnand a combat elTectiveness edge over its opponent, the
following condition must be satisfied:
The force's aciual battle results ratio fnusi be greater than its theoretical combat power
ratio. That is, the force's CE value must be greater than one.
In the rare case that a force's actual battle results ratio equals its theoretical combat
power ratio, the QJM defines the opponents to have equal combat elTectiveness.
Does the above condition make military sense? Note that the QJM Combat
Effectiveness equation consists of two ratios describing the same battle. The ratios
R(b),'R(r) and P'(b);P'(r) are not independant in the sense that changes in one affect the
other. If a force is outnumbered in terms of personnel and weapons, yet manages to win
or nearly win a battle, we would assume it is because the force is better trained, led, and
motivated. The Combat Effectiveness equation reflects this conclusion by identifying a
force's combat effectiveness to be equal to its actual battle results ratio times the
reciprocal of its theoretical combat power ratio. Finally, the equations in Figure 10
show that combat elTectiveness (CE) values for opposing forces are ahvays reciprocals
of each other.
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The following example utilizes constructive data to illustrate the Q.lM's
definition of combat effectiveness for a fictional battle.
Example 6
Step 1: THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER (P')
FACTOR BLUE FORCE RED FORCE
Force Strength (S) 500 1500
Operational/Environmental (OE) 2.5 1.0
Theoretical Combat Power values:
Blue Force: P'{b) = S{b) x OE{b) = 500 x 2. 5 = 1,250
Red Force: P'(z ^ S{r} x OEir) = 1 ,500 x 1. = 1,500
Theoretical Combat Power Ratios:
Blue Force:
Red Force:
P'{b) 1,250
P'in
P'ir)
P'[b)
1,500
= .83
= 1. 2
Discussion: The red force is theoretically more combat
powerful than its blue opponent. Based on this advantage
in firepower and personnel, should the red force be expected
to win the battle? Step 2 shows what actually happened.
26
BLUE FORCE RED FORCE
5 3
2.0 0.5
2.0 -1.
Step 2: ACTUAL BATTLE RESULTS (R)
FACTOR
Mission Accomplishment (M)
Ability to Gain or Hold Ground (G)
Effectiveness when Casualties are Incurred (C)
Actual Battle Results values:
Blue Force: R{b) = M{b) + G{b) + C(b) = 5 + 2.0 + 2.0 = 9.0
Red Force: /?(r) = W(r) + ^(r) + C(r) = 3 + 0. 5 + ( -1) = 2. 5
Actual Battle Results Ratios:
Blue Force: -=-— =
-z,
—
— =3.6
R[r) 2. 5
Red Force: 4^ = 28
R{b)
Discussion: The actual battle results ratio reveals that the blue
force won the engagement. Remarkably, the blue force was outmanned
and outgunned.
One critical aspect of the ratio is the relative size of
the factors M, G, and C. The larger a factor is, relative to the
other factors, the greater its impact on determining R. For ex-
ample by doubling each force's M factor while leaving the values
for G and C constant, we obtain values for M(b) of 10 and M(r) of
6. These new values produce results ratios of 2. 55 for the blue
force R(b)/R(r) and .39 for the red force R(r)/R(b).
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Example 6: Step 2 (continued)
On the other hand, by doubling the factor G while keeping the
other factors at their original values, we obtain values for G(b)
of 4 and G(r) of 1. These doubled values then produce results ratios
of 3. 66 and . 27 for the blue and red forces respectively.
As a result of doubling each sides M factor, the blue force's
results ratio decreased from 3.6 to 2.55 and the red force's results
ratio increased from .28 to . 39. When the relatively smaller G factor
was doubled for each side, the results ratio for the blue force barely
increased (3.6 to 3.66) and the results ratio for the red force de-
creased only slightly (.28 to .27).
This example shows that the QJM actual battle results ratio
is most sensitive to changes in its largest factor M . In Step 3,
combat effectiveness (CE) is computed using the data from our initial
calculations.
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step 3: CALCULATING COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS (CE)
Blue Force:
Red Force:
= [. 28 X . 833] = . 23
Discussion: In terms of numbers of personnel and weapons
and operational/environmental factors, the blue force was
weaker than its red adversary. Nonetheless, history shows
that the blue force overcame this disadvantage to win the
battle. As shown in the step 3 calculations, the answer
to this discrepancy lies in the combat effectiveness
of the respective forces. According to the QJM, the blue
force is four times more combat effective than red. If
this example represented an actual battle, then the blue
force should be scrutinized in order to learn how its train-
ing, officer and enlisted leadership, tactics, and motivation
contributed to outstanding combat effectiveness.
2. Determining Combat Po>ver (P)
The final analytical stage in the QJM involves substituting the combat
effectiveness component (CE) for the troop quality factor (Q) in the original Combat
Power equation. This substitution results in the Combat Power (P) of a force which had
engaged in historical combat. Symbolically, combat power is defmed as:5
Combat Po>>er (P): P= SxOExCE
5 It might be more accurate to write P^ 5 x OE x CE , since CE approximaies Q in
Clauseuitz's equation for combat power. However, the QJM continues to use an equality ( = )
symbol.
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Substituting from our previously defined expressions, the combat power (P) of
the bkie force is defined in the foliowins fieure:
P{h) = S{b) X OE{h) X CE{b)
= P'{b) X CE{b)
where P'{b) = S{b) x OE{b)
Equivalently:
P{b) = P'{b) X
Rib) Fir)
X
L R('') P'ib)
Rib)
R{r)
X P'{r)
where CE{b)
Rib)
^
P'i>)
R{r} P\b)
Figure 11. Combat Po>\er Equations
To compute P(r), interchange subscripts (r) and (b) giving:
?(;) = P\r) X CEir)
or equivalently,
''('-)
^U-^^'**)-
a. Reasonableness of the Combat Power Equation
According to the QJM, the combat power of a military force is equal to its
theoretical combat power times its combat effectiveness value. From a mihtary
standpoint, this relationship appears credible. The equation implies that true battlefield
performance is a function of the number and type of weapons which a force possesses
plus the fighting qualities of its personnel. Common sense supports QJM's declaration
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that maximum performance on the battlefield requires not only a sufficient number of
weapons but highly trained, well lead and motivated personnel to use them.
The second expression for combat power gi\en by Figure 1 1 seems at first
glance to be erroneous. It states that a force's combat power is equal to its actual battle
results ratio times the theoretical combat power of its opponent. How can the QJ.M
attempt to quantify a force's combat power without considering its weapons and
personnel? Investigation of this issue, reveals that QJM includes each force's weapons
and personnel (i.e. force strength (S) ) in computing the actual battle results ratio.
Specifically, force strength is included in the calculations for ability to gain or hold
ground (G) and force effectiveness when casualties are incurred (C). These factors,
ability to gain or hold ground (G) and force casualty effectiveness (C). are dissected and
analyzed in the next chapter. The ensuing example demonstrates the process for
computing combat power. To maintain continuity, the data of the previous example is
used.
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BLUE FORCE RED FORCE
500 1,500
2.5 1.0
1,250 1,500
0.83 1.2
9.0 2.5
3.6 0. 28
4.32 0. 23
Example 7
COMBAT POWER (P)
Recall the calculations and data from the preceding example:
FACTOR
Force Strength (S)
Operational/environmental (OE)
Theoretical Combat Power (P')
Theoretical Combat Power Ratio (P'/P')
Actual Battle Results (R)
Actual Battle Results Ratio (R/R)
Combat Effectiveness (CE)
Combat Power Values:
Blue Force: P{b) = P'(b) x CE(b) = 1250 x 4. 32 = 5 ,400
Red Force: P{r) = P'(r) x CEyr) = 1500 x . 23 = 345
Discussion: The blue force possesses an overwhelming combat power
advantage. Superior combat effectiveness of the blue force acts as
a combat multiplier in its favor. Likewise, the red force's lack
of combat effectiveness reduces its combat power potential.
3. The Combat Po\Ner Ratio
Historical combat is analyzed in the QJM by evaluating and manipulating the
combat power ratio of opposing forces. Dupuy, in a private communication, defines the
Combat PoAver (?) Ratio by:
32
Combat PoA\er Ratio (blue force):
Pih) S{h) X OE{h) X CEih)
P{y) ~ S[r) X 0E{))
Combat Po\>er Ratio (red force):
Pir) S{r)xOE{i]x CE(r)
P{b) ~ S{b) X OE(b)
Figure 12. Combat Power Ratio
a. ReasonabU'iess of the Combat Poner Ratio
Assuming that P = S x OE x CE still defines combat power, then the QJM
combat power ratio seeing to be incorrect. The problem is thai the denominator S x OE
in Figure 12 is nor equal to P. since P is defined differently in Figure 11. Possibly, Dupuy
intends the denominator P to be equal to theoretical combat power P'. However, if this
is indeed Dupuy's desire, then the expression Pib) P'(r) still does not make sense. Figure
13 shows mathematically that the expression P{b) P'(r) simplifies to R(b) R(r) and this
is clearlv not the intent of the model.
P[b) S(b)xOE{b)x CE{b)
P'[r) Sir) X OE[r}
P'(h)x CEib)
P\r)
where P' = Sx OE
Rib)
-^"-^1 R(b)
P'{r) ^
- Where CE{b) -
^.^^^^P\r)
P\r)
R(b)
R[r)
Figure 13. Combat Power Ratio Discrepancy
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The preceding figure shows an inconsistency in the QJM combat power
ratio. Substitution reveals that a force's combat power ratio is equal to its actual battle
results ratio. However, these two ratios are in fact diflerent. To further confuse matters,
in his book Understanding War, Dupuy contradicts his Figure 12 equations when he
includes each force's combat effectiveness (CE) value in the combat power ratio [Ref
8: pp. 96,99-100.102]. To illustrate the problem just described, the following excerpts
from Understanding War are provided in Figure 14 [Ref 8]. Note that G denotes
Germany, A denotes Allies, and terrain and posture factors are represented by OE.
Additionally, in the reference. CEV is equivalent to CE.
Page 96 in Understanding War, defines the combat power ratio as:
P(G) S{G)xOaO)x CE{G)
P{A) ~ S{A} X OE{A) X CE{A)
Page 100 defines the combat power ratio for the Ardennes battle as:
P(G) 1.712 X 1 X 1.2
P{A) 720 X l.S2x 1.0
= 1.57
Figure 14. Combat Po^ver as defined in 'Understanding War'
The excerpts in Figure 14 reveal a discrepancy regarding the QJM combat
power ratio. The discrepancy concerns the CE values for the German and Allied forces.
As pre\ioush' discussed, opposing force CE values are always reciprocals of one another.
If the Germans had a CE of 1.2. then the Allied CE should be .83 and not 1.
There are two possible interpretations of the inconsistencies in the QJM
combat power ratio. They are:
1. If Dupuy desires to apply CE to only one side (let's assume the blue force) then
he probably intends his combat power ratio to be:
X CE{h)
P\r)
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As Figure 13 shows, this expression reduces, through mathematical substitution,
to R{b) R(r). It is unlikely that this is Dupuy's motive, since we know that
R(b) R(r) is computed through entirely different means.
2. A second possible interpretation is that the rule of reciprocity for opposing force
CE values is not being followed. This statement is borne out in Figure 14 where the
German and AlUed CE values are nonreciprocal.
The apparent inconsistencies in the combat power ratio, forced us to
reexamine Dupuy's philosophy of how relative combat power should be expressed. Our
first thoughts were to simply equate relative combat power to the ratio of opposing force
Combat Power equations. Figure 15 contains our initial proposal for expressing relative
combat power.
Combat Power Ratio (blue force):
P{b) Sib)xOEih]xCE{b
Combat Po»er Ratio (red force):
P{r) S[r) X OE[r) x CE[r)
P(r) S(r) X 0E{)) x CE{r)
Pib) S{b} X OE{b} X CE{b}
Figure 15. Proposed Combat Power Ratio
The proposed combat power ratio includes each force's strength.
operational environmental, and actual combat effectiveness values. We did recognize
that a portion of the equation. CE(b) CE(r) or CE{r) CE(b). was a ratio of reciprocal
values and thus would distort our final combat power ratio value. Still, we were curious
to explore what results the proposed combat power ratio would provide. The next
example uses the proposed form to compute a combat power ratio for opposing forces.
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Example 8
From the previous two examples we obtained:
FACTOR
Force Strength (S)
Operational/environmental (OE)
Theoretical Combat Power (P')
Theoretical Combat Power Ratio (P'/P')
Actual Battle Results (R)
Actual Battle Results Ratio (R/R)
Combat Effectiveness (CE)
Proposed Combat Power Ratios:
Blue Force:
P\b) 500 X 2.5 X 4. 32
^ ^3 ^3
LUE FORCE RED FORCE
500 1,500
2.5 1.0
1,250 1,500
0. 83 1.2
9. 2.5
3.6 0. 28
4. 32 0. 23
P[r) 1500 X 1. X . 23
Red Force:
Pir) 1500 X 1. X . 23
Pib) 500 X 2.5 X 4. 32
= .063
Discussion: For this fictional battle, the proposed combat power ratio
reveals total relative combat power and fighting capabilities for oppos'
ing forces. In this example, the blue force's combat power ratio has
ballooned to 15. 65. Is this result reasonable? As previously stated,
opposing force CE values are reciprocals of one another,
(continued on next page)
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Example 8 (continued')
For the forces in this example, the division of opposing force
CE values produces distortion factors of the following magnitudes:
^•^^=18.8 and / ^^„ = . 05
.23 4. 32
A combat power ratio for the blue force of 15. 65 is not supported by
the data. The blue force, though slightly less strong than its opponent,
does possess a more than 4 to 1 CE edge. However, this advantage bears
no resemblance to the overwhelming 15. 65 value which the proposed ratio
produced. Clearly, dividing by reciprocal CE values distorts our attempt
to quantify this battle. Therefore , our proposed combat power ratio
seems unreasonable and not suitable for comparing forces of historical
battles
.
In our search to identify a valid expression for relative combat power, we
again considered Dupuys attempt to apply CE to only one force at a time. We were
beginning to feel confident that Dupuy wanted an expression for relative combat power
of the following general form:
P'{b)
—
— X CE[b) (raised to some power)
We decided to first experiment with CE raised to the one-half power or, in
other words, the square root of CE. Our proposed model took the following form:
P'[b)
F{r
X ^CE{b)
Through substitution and simplification, the above expression reduced to a simple, yet
remarkably profound quantity. We felt certain that we had hit upon the mysterious CE
quantity which Dupuy had been searching for. The following figure shows what our
proposed model simplifies to and we define this quantity as Relative Combat Power
(RCP):
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RCP(b)
S[h) X OBh) X ^'CEjh)
S{r) X OE{r)
P'(h)
'I.A VP'{r}
X ^. CE{b) where P' = S x OE
P'ib) Rib) P'jr) R{b) Fir
^ J -E7T ^ l^rrrr ^'here C£(6) = -r-— X —
-
P\r) V R[r) P\b) ' ' R{r) P'{b)
R{b) P'ib)
X
R{y) P\r)
Figure 16. Relative Combat Poner Equation
The Relative Combat Power equation states that a force's combat power,
relative to its opponent, is equal to the square root of its actual battle results ratio
multiphed by its theoretical combat power ratio. In other words, relative combat power
is a function of two quantities: the forces' theoretical combat power (weapons,
environment, and military posture; readiness) and actual combat performance (results
ratio). Using the combat data from Example 8, we calculate relative combat power
(RCP) in the following example:
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Example 9
From the previous example we obtain:
FACTOR
Force Strength (S)
Operational/environmental (OE)
Theoretical Combat Power (P')
Theoretical Combat Power Ratio (P'/P')
Actual Battle Results (R)
Actual Battle Results Ratio (R/R)
Combat Effectiveness (CE)
Relative Combat Power (RCP);
BLUE FORCE RED FORCE
500 1,500
2.5 1.0
1,250 1,500
0. 83 1.2
9.0 2.5
3. 6 0. 28
4. 32 0. 23
Blue Force: RCPib) = ^'^'
^OE^.b^^.'^Eib^
^ 500 x 2 5 x v4. 32 ^
^ ,3
'
S(r) X OEin 1500 x 1
p^, f^v^^. vrD, ; 5ir) X OE\r) x yggip 1500 x 1 x ^! . 23 ^7Red Force : RCP[r) = r—-
—
z^^ = FT^T;—^^^7 = . 57S{b) X OE{b) 500 X 2. 5
Discussion: The blue force possesses a relative combat power (RCP)
value of 1.73, which means that, in this historic battle, the blue
force was 1. 73 times more combat powerful than its red opponent.
This value is consistent with the combat data which revealed the
blue force to be slightly inferior in theoretical combat power, but
more than four times as combat effective. Likewise, the red force
RCP is . 57 and also in line with the combat data. Finally ^ it
should be noted that opposing force RCP values are reciprocals of
one another.
The Relative Combat Power (RCP) equation, appears to be the equation
best suited to comparing the combat power of opposing forces in historic combat. We
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examined the inconsistencies in the existing QJM combat power ratio and came to the
conclusion that Dupuy was clearly on the right track when he wanted to apply CE to
only one force at a time. Experimentation revealed that applying the square root of a
force's CE to its theoretical combat power ratio would give us the relative combat power
expression we were loo^dng for. Additionally, we discovered that opposing force RCP
values are reciprocals of one another.
4. Section Summary
This section has defined QJM's two basic submodels: the Actual Battle Results
equation and the Combat Power equation. These equations are used to obtain the
results ratio and combat power ratio for historic battles. The QJM combat power ratio
appears to be algebraically incorrect and a Relative Combat Power equation has been
offered as an alternative. Additionally, theoretical combat power (P') is introduced and
defined as a military force's strength (Sj multiplied by its operational and environmental
(OE) factors. A force's combat elTectiveness (CE) is defined by the QJM as its actual
battle results ratio divided by its theoretical battle results ratio. Three examples were
used to illustrate how the QJM quantifies a combatant's combat efiectiveness, combat
power, and relative combat power.
In the next chapter the following combat factors used in the QJM are defined
and examined for militar}' reasonableness:
mission accomplishment (M)
force strength (S)
ability to gain or hold ground (G)
effectiveness when casualties are incurred (C)
operational environmental factors (OE)
•
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IV. DECOMPOSITIOiN OF QJM COMBAT FACTORS
A. A REVIEW OF KEY QJM RELATIONSHIPS
In the preceding chapter, the QJM was introduced and described. This chapter
decomposes and analyzes the QJM combat factors mission accompHshment (M), force
strength (S), ability to gain or hold ground (G), force effectiveness when casualties are
incurred (C). and operational/environmental (OE) factors. Before analyzing these
factors, let us review key QJM relationships. Recall that the Quantified Judgement
Model uses two submodels to analyze historic combat.
Combat Power Equation: P = S x OE x Q
where:
P = combat power of the force
S = force strength (number and type of weapons plus personnel)
OE = operational environmental
Q = quality of troops
and
Actual Battle Results Equation: R = M + G + C
where:
R = battle results of the force
M = mission accomplishment
G = ability to gain or hold ground
C = effectiveness when casualties are incurred
Figure 17. QJM Submodels
Both submodels are used to define ratios. These ratios allow actual battles to be
analyzed both descriptively and theoretically. Using the example of blue (b) and red (r)
adversaries, recall that the ratios are defined bv:
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Theoretical Combat Power Ratio =
P'{r)
where P' = S x OE
and
Actual Battle Results Ratio = Ml
R[r)
Figure 18. Theoretical Combat Power and Actual Battle Results Ratios
These ratios are then used to define combat effectiveness (CE) for military forces.
Combat effectiveness (CE) in the QJM embodies the human fighting qualities of
leadership, morale, training, chance luck, and so forth. Since these intangibles are not
directly measurable, the QJM defines CE as the differential between theoretical (what
should have happened) and actual (what did happen) battle results. The QJM defines
combat efiectiveness (CE) by:
Combat Effectiveness (blue force): CE{b)
R{b) P'ir)
X
Combat Effectiveness (red force): CE{r) =
R(h)
Rlr)
P'jh)
P'[r}
R(i')
Rib)
P'(r) ' I R(b)
'^
P'{r)
R{>) P\l^}
R(r) P'(b)
X
P\b)
Figure 19. Combat Effectiveness Equation
The final analytical stage in the QJM involves substituting the combat effectiveness
component (CE) for the troop quality factor (Q) in the original Combat Power equation.
This substitution results in the combat power (?) of a force which had engaged in
historical combat. The combat power of a fighting force encompasses weapon lethality
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(by type and number of weapons), military posture, terrain, weather, and human factors.
The QJM defines combat power (P) by:
Combat Po\>er (blue force): P{b) = S{b) x OE{b) x CE{b)
Combat Po»er (red force): F(r) = S{r) x OE{r) x CE{r)
Figure 20. Combat Power Equation
Historic battles are analyzed by using the combat power of combatants as ratios.
The combat power ratio is the QJM' s primary measure for evaluating opposing forces. A
force which possesses i combat power ratio greater than one is the overall superior
force. In Chapter 3. the QJM combat power ratio was found to be inconsistent with the
definition of combat power for the blue and red forces. Thus a Relative Combat Power
equation was derived in Chapter 3 and is defined by:
Relative Combat Power (blue force): RCF{b) = —
S[r) X OE[r
Relative Combat Power (red force): RCP{r} = —
S[b) X OE[b)
Figure 21. Relative Combat Power Equation
B. DECOMPOSITION OF QJM COMBAT FACTORS
Up to this point in the thesis, the QJM combat factors have been introduced and
described through numerous equations and examples. However, little emphasis has been
placed on exploring how they are actually derived. In this section, the following QJM
battlefield factors are defined and their derivations analyzed for reasonableness:
• mission accomphshment (M)
• force strength (S)
• ability to gain or hold ground (G)
• force effectiveness when casualties are incurred (C)
• operational/environmental (OE)
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1. Mission Accomplishment (M)
The QJM describes mission accomplishment (M) as, "An expert judgement of
the extent to which a force accomplished its assigned or perceived mission. "[Ref. 8: p.
88] The QJM mission accomplishment values, scaled from one to ten. are presented in
the succeeding figure.
Level of Mission Accomplishment Vari abl e Range (M) Normal
Complete 7-10 8
Substantial /Relatively Satisfactory 5-7 6
Partial/Less than Satisfactory 3-5 4
Little Achievement 1-3 2
Figure 22. Levels of Mission Accomplishment
a. Reasonableness of the Mission Accomplishment Table
Mission accomphshment (VI) is a subjective judgement based upon an
individual's personal experiences and biases. Although subjective judgements are open
to debate and prone ^.o change, they are sometimes, as in the case of mission
accomplishment (M), the only means of evaluation. Before choosing a mission
accomplishment level, the decision maker should consider the relationship between the
type of mission assigned and the force tasked to execute it. A well trained and led Hght
infantn.' unit matched against armor or mechanized infantr\" is an example of an
unreasonable mission assignment. To continue with this example, assume the inlantry
unit is defeated. A low mission accomplishment (M) value for the infantry" unit leads to
a lower battle results (R) value, which contributes to a lower combat effectiveness (CE)
value. Consequently, an excellent unit (in this case our hypothetical light infantr> unit)
may not be, according to the QJVI, highly combat effective. If the infantry unit is
assigned a mission suited to its combat capabilities, it is likely to have a more realistic
QJM combat effectiveness value. The preceding discussion emphasizes the importance
of thorough research to ensure the assignment of appropriate M values.
2. Force Strength (S)
The QJM defines force strength (S) as the summation of weapon system
lethality values, modified by environmental and operational factors, for eight major
types of weapon systems [Ref 9: p. 46]. The force strength (S) equation is shown in the
following figure.
44
Force Strength (blue force): S{b) = ^/7,- (/;) x 011^ {b) x I] [b)
i=l
Force Strength (red force): S{r) =- ^Hi (/) x OL/, {r} x I] (/)
where:
S = Ibrce strength
n = the number of weapons in a specific category (listed below)
OLI = Operational Lethality Index of a weapon system
V = weapon effects (terrain, weather, season, and air superiority
i = the eight QJM weapon system categories (listed below)
1 = small arms
2 = machine guns
3 = heavy weapons
4 = anti-armor
5 = artillery
6 = air defense
7 = armor
8 = close air support
Figure 23. Force Strength Equation
a. Reasonableness of the Force Strength Equation
Force strength (S) is a function of three components: number of weapons,
lethality of weapons, and weapon modifying factors. The first component, number of
weapons (n), is simply the quantity of weapons (by categon,') which a force possesses.
The second component, weapon lethahty, is defined in [Ref 9: p. 19] as:
The inherent capability of a given weapon system to kill personnel, or to make
material ineflective in a given period of time, where capability includes the factors
of weapon range, rate of fire, accuracy, radius of effects, and battlefield mobility.
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The QJM uses Operational Lethality Indices (OLIs) to quantify weapon
efiectiveness. OLIs consider such weapon characteristics as rate of fire, number of
potential targets per strike, reUabihty, accuracy, range and so forth [Ref 9: p. 27].
Where needed, Dupuy and associates have developed formulae to quantify specific
weapon characteristics. All relevant QJM weapon characteristics, plus weapon
dispersion factors, are combined through addition, multiplication and division to form
the OLI's of weapons in the eight categories.
The third and final component, weapon effects, is composed of factors such
as terrain, weather, season, and air superiority (Ref 9: pp. 228-230]. Weapon effects (V),
for each of the eight weapon system categories, is the product of either one, two, three
or four factors (terrain, weather, season, and air superiority). The rules for determining
which factors go with a particular weapon system categorv* are found in [Ref 9: p. 46].
Again, when V is actually calculated for one of the eight weapon system categories, these
factors are multiplied together rather than being additive. Finally, the reader should be
aware that I' and OE are not independant. That is, they share some common factors such
as terrain, weather, and season.
The QJM incorporates the three components (n, OLI. and V) into the Force
Strength equation to determine S. The F"orce Strength (S) equation is illuminated
through the following simple example.
46
Example 1
WEAPON TYPE NUMBER (n) OLI
M-16 30 0. 35
Machine gun 5 1.0
TOW 3 176
M-60 tank 2 797
WEAPON EFFECTS (V)
0.8 (terrain: flat , heavily wooded)
0.8 (terrain: flat , heavily wooded)
0.8 (terrain: flat jheavily wooded)
0.8 (terrain: flat jheavily wooded)
and
0. 5 (weather: wet ,heavy, temperate)
Force Strength (S):
S = (30)(. 35)(. 8) + (5)(lj(. 8) + (3)(176)(. 8) + (2)(797j(. S){. 5) = 1072. 4
Discussion: The small force in this example possesses a strength
value of 1072.4. The force operates in flat heavily wooded terrain
during periods of heavy rain. In this example, all four weapon
types are affected by terraiUj but only the tank is affected by
the weather factor.
What happens to the force, described in Example 1, when it operates in
different terrain and weather conditions? For example, suppose the force operates in flat,
hard, and bare terrain. The weather conditions are ideal: temperate, sunshine, and dry.
These conditions are more favorable to the force than those in Exarnple 1. Therefore,
we should expect the force to possess an equal or greater force strength value (S).
Example 2 reveals the force's strength when it operates in these new circumstances.
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Example 2
WEAPON TYPE NUMBER (n) OLI WEAPON EFFECTS (V)
M-16 30 0.35 1.0 (terrain: flat, bare, and hard)
Machine gun 5 1.0 1.0 (terrain: flat , bare, and hard)
TOW 3 176 1.0 (terrain: flat, bare, and hard)
M-60 tank 2 797 1.0 (terrain: flat , bare, and hard)
and
1. (weather: temperate, dry, sunshine)
Force Strength (S):
S = (30)(. 35)(1) + (5)(1)(1) + (3)(176,Kl) + (2)(797)(1)(1) = 2137. 5
Discussion: The military force is stronger in a more favorable
environment. Consequently, the force's strength value (S) has
increased from 1072.4 to 2137.5.
These two examples, 1 and 2. show the QJM strength equation to be
reasonable from a common sense perspective. To further test the reasonableness of the
strength equations, let's explore what happens to force strength in a severely degraded
environment. In other words, what happens to the same force when it fights in harsh
terrain and poor weather. If the force fights in rugged, heavily wooded terrain during
extremely cold wet weather conditions, what happens to its force strength? The next
example computes S for these terrain and weather conditions.
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Example 3
WEAPON TYPE NUMBER (n) OLI
M-16 30 0. 35
Machine gun 5 1.
TOW 3 176
M-60 tank 2 797
WEAPON EFFECTS (V)
0.6 (terrain: rugged, heavily wooded)
0.6 ( terrain: rugged, heavily wooded)
0.6 (terrain: rugged, heavily wooded)
0. 6 (terrain: rugged, heavily wooded)
and
0.5 (weather: wet , heavy , extreme cold)
Force Strength (S):
S = (30)(. 35)(. 6) + (5)a)(. 6) + (3)(176)(. 6) + (2)(797)(. 6)(. 5) = 804. 3
Discussion: This example further reinforces the reasonableness
of the QJM Strength equation. This and the previous two examples
show that weapons by themselves are not the ultimate indicators of
military force strength. Rather, environmental (terrain, weather,
and season) and operational (air superiority) factors act to either
increase or decrease weapon capabilities.
3. Ability to Gain or Hold Ground (G)
The ability to gain or hold ground factor (G) is described as. "A value
representing the extent to which a force was able to gain or hold ground." [Ref. 8; p.
88] Dupuy and associates mathematically define G by:
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Ability to Gain or Hold Ground (blue force):
^,,, / S(r) POShT (AD{r) + A(r))
3S{b) POS{h) A[h}
Ability to gain or hold ground (red force):
^, , / Sib) PO i{hi iAD{b) + Aih)}
V 35(/-) POS{}) A[r)
where:
G = ability of force to gain or hold ground
S = force strength
D = average daily distance of advance or withdrawl {"or forces
in contact (positive for advancing force, negative for withdrawing
force)
A = depth of area occupied by the force
POS = niilitar}' posture of the force (hsted below)
Posture Value (POS)
Attack 1.
Defense (hasty) 1.3
Defense (prepared) 1.5
Defense (fortified) 1.6
Withdrawal 1. 15
Delay 1. 2
Figure 24. Ability to Gain or Hold Ground Equation
a. Reasonableness of the Ability to Gain or Hold Ground Equation
The Abihty to Gain or Hold Ground equation, [Ref 9: p. 48], does not
appear reasonable from a military standpoint. In battle, military forces strive to either
gain (offense) or hold ground (defense) and thereby maximize their respective G factors.
Unfortunately, the equation does not reflect a force's desire to maximize G. For
instance, examining the equation for G(b) we see that as the blue force (b) increases its
strength, its value for G(b) decreases. Similarly, as a force increases its defensive posture,
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its G factor also decreases. The numbers in the equation, three and four, appear to be
adjustment factors but their significance and the reason lor these particular values, is
not known. The subsequent example uses constructive data to illustrate the
unsuitabihty of the Ability to Gain or Hold Ground equation.
Example 4
FACTOR
Force Strength (S)
Military Posture (POS)
Depth of Area (A)
Average Daily Advance or
Withdrawal Distance (D)
Ability to Gain or Hold Ground (G):
Blue Force:
BLUE FORCE RED FORCE
50,000 20,000
1. 1.6
11 km 7 km
+ 1 km -1 km
r,hs I 20,000 1.6 (4( -11 + 7) ...
^^^^ = V 3(50,000. ^ -I" ^ n = • ^^^
Red Force:
/ 50,000 1 (4(+l)+ 11.) . _,
^'^' = V 3(20,000, "TT" 7 =^-°^
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Discussion: A subscript is not assigned to the equation's
D variable in (Ref. 9: p. 48). As shown in Figure 24, the
assumption is made that D(r) goes with the G(b) equation
and D(b) to the G(r) equation.
The Ability to Gain or Hold Ground equation shows the red
force to be more than four times as effective as blue in either
gaining or holding ground. Do these results make military sense?
The combat data shows the blue force to possess an overwhelming
advantage in force strength (S). Additionally, the blue force
was able to advance, on average, one kilometer per day against
red defenses. In view of these facts, the Ability to Gain
or Hold Ground equation seems questionable. Logic supports
the argument that the blue force should not be four times less
effective as red in this area.
If the blue force's strength is doubled to 100,000, its depth
of area increased to 16 kilometers and all other factors held
constant, what would be the result? Since the blue force is now
100 percent stronger, common sense suggests that its ability to
gain or hold ground should improve. The following results are
obtained when the blue force's strength (S) and depth of area (A)
are increased to 100,000 and 16 kilometers respectively.
ni V . ^M / 20,000 1.6 (4(-li+ 7) ...Blue Force: C^b) =
^ 3^100, 000.
^
"T- ^ —16 = ' ^^^
V ^ V . r, / 3(100,000) 1 (4( +1) + 16) , ...Red Force: Gin =
^j ^^^^^^
x
-^-^
x =5.17
Discussion: This example illustrates the inadequacy of the
Ability to Gain or Hold Ground equation. The blue force has
increased its strength (by 100 percent) while red's strength
has remained constant. In spite of the blue force's strength
increase, its value for G(b) has decreased from .241 to .141.
52
To improve the Ability to Gain or Hold Ground equation, the following
modified equation is ofTered as an alternative.
Blue Force:
Red Force:
G{b) =
.
G{r) =
^
Sib) POSib) {AD{b) + Aib))
V S(r) " POSir) " A{r)
1 Sir) POSir) i4D{r) + A[r))
1 S{b) ^ POS{b) ^ A{b)
Figure 25. Modified Ability to Gain or Hold Ground Equation
The modified Ability to Gain or Hold Ground equation is used in the next
example. To assist in comparing both equations (QJM and modified), the data fi-om
Example 4 is used.
Example 5
FACTOR BLUE FORCE RED FORCE
S 50,000 20,000
POS 1. 1. 6
A 11 km 7 km
D + 1 km -1 km
ni 17 ru ' 50,000 1 t4( +1)+ 11) , __Blue Force:
^<^> = ^ "20700^ ^ 17^ ^ 1 ' =^-^^
^ A V r / 20,000 1.6 (4( -1)+ 7) ,._Red Force
:
Gm =
^/^oToO^ ^ "T- ^ 11 ^ ' ^^^
Discussion: The modified equation reveals the blue force to
be superior in gaining or holding ground. These results
seem reasonable when the red force's strength and daily advance
rate advantages are considered. Let's now examine (as we did
in Example 4) what happens to G when the blue force's strength
is doubled to 100,000 and its depth of area increased to 16
kilometers.
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m r . r^.. I 100. OQO 1 (4(4-1)+ 16) . ..Blue Force: G{b) = , / ^ ^ ^ ^
^
x ^;
—
— x—
=; = 2. 9
J
V 20,000 1.6
Red Force;
^'^^^VTooT
/ 20,000 1.6 (4( -1)+ 7)
000 16
= .244
Discussion: Logically, the blue force's G value has increased
to 2. 98 when both its strength and depth of area increased.
Example 5 provides strong evidence that the modified Ability
to Gain or Hold Ground equation is militarily more reason-
able than the present QJM version.
4, Effectiveness >vhen Casualties are Incurred (C)
The eflectiveness when casualties are incurred factor (C) is described as. "A
value representing the efTiciency of the force in terms of casualties, taking into
consideration the strengths of the two sides and the casualties incurred by both sides."
[Ref 8: p. 88] The QJM [Ref 9; p. 49] defines C by:
Effectiveness ^hen Casualties are Incurred (blue force):
C[b) = {VL{r)yx 1
CASir) POSih) S(b) CASib)
~
V CAS{b) " POS{r) " S{r) V .V(^)
Effectiveness >\hen Casualties are Incurred (red force):
C{r) = (VL{b)fx 1
CASib) POSir) Sir) 1 CASir) 1
V CAS{r) " POSib) " S{h) "V A'(')
where:
C = eflectiveness of force when it incurs casualties
VL = vulnerability of the force to hostile firepower {see Figure 27)
CAS = average daily number of casualties
POS = militar}- posture of the force, (see Figure 24)
S = force strength
N = total number of personnel in the force
Figure 26. Effectiveness nhen Casualties are Incurred Equation
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Figure 27 defines the QJM Vulnerability equation. The vulnerability Victors
POSV, AIRV. AMPHV. and TD are listed in [Ref. 9: pp. 228,230,231] using the notation
£/„ I- vv. and t\.
Vulnerability (blue force):
VL{b) = 1
Mb) X POSl\b) X (S(r))^ x AIRV{h) x AMPHV(b)
TD[b) X {S{b)) 1.5
Vulnerability (red force):
VL{r) = 1 -
Mr) x POSV(f) X iS{b)f X AIRV(r) x AMPHJ'ir)
TD{r) X (S(r)) 1.5
where:
VL= vulnerabihty of the force to hostile firepower
X= number of personnel in force
POSV= posture vulnerabihty offeree
AIRV= vulnerability due to air status
AMPHV = vulnerability during amphibious operations or river crossings
TD= terrain factor when force is in the defense
S = force strensth
Figure 27, Vulnerability Equation
a. Reasonableness of Effectiveness when Casualties Incurred Equation
The Effectiveness when Casualties are Incurred equation seems reasonable
from a militar>' standpoint. The equation states that a force's effectiveness (in terms of
operating with casualties) is a function of its opponents vulnerabihty and casualty ratio,
its own posture and strength ratios, and the proportion of its casualties to total
personnel. According to the equation, a force becomes increasingly effective as its
opponent becomes more vulnerable, suffers more casualties and decreases in strength.
Similarly, a force increases its effectiveness as it improves its defensive posture and
suffers fewer casualties.
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The next example illustrates the use of the Eflectiveness when Casualties
are Incurred equation. The example data is constructive and intended solely for
demonstration.
Example 6
FACTOR
Force Strength (S)
Number of Personnel (N)
Average Daily Number of Casualties (CAS)
Vulnerability to Hostile Firepower (VL)
Military Posture (POS)
UE FORCE RED FORCE
50,000 20 ,000
1,200 800
60 40
0. 85 0.6
1.0 1. 6
Blue Force:
Red Force:
C{b)
C{r\
6)2 X
85)2 ^
/ 40
/ —— X
1 50,000
X ,„',„„ -10V 60 1.6 20,000
60 1.6 20,000
X —:;— XV 40 50,000 10
/ 60
\ 1,20C)
, 40
V 800
=
= -1. 86
-1.53
Discussion: Both forces possess negative values for C. The
red force, though, is more effective (in terms of operating
with casualties) and has a C value of -1.53. Is this result
to be expected? Even though the blue force holds a strength
and personnel edge, its high vulnerability value increases
red force effectiveness. Likewise, its low posture value
reduces its own effectiveness.
If the blue force (of Example 6) increases its strength (S) and personnel by
50 percent and all other factors remain constant, what should happen to the values C(b)
and C(r)? The following example calculates C(b) and C(r) for a 50 percent increase in
blue strength and personnel.
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Example 7
FACTOR BLUE FORCE RED FORCE
S 75,000 20 ,000
N 1,800 800
CAS 60 40
VL 0.85 0.6
POS 1. 1.6
Blue Force: C[b) =
Cir) = (
(.6)2x
85)2 ^
/40
.. 1 ., 75,000
V 60 " 1. 6 " 20,000
-10
Red Force: / 60 1.6 20,000V 40 " 1 " 75,000 -10
/ 60
V 1,80C)
; 40 1
\ 800
=
= -1. 37
1.65
Discussion: The blue force's ability to operate with casualties
has improved relative to the red force. A 50 percent increase
in strength and personnel has raised C(b) from -1.86 to -1.37.
This result appears reasonable and reinforces the credibility
of the Effectiveness when Casualties are Incurred equation.
5. Operational and Environinental Factors (OE)
The final QJM combat Rictor is operationalenvironmental (OE) which is
described as: "The variable factors reflecting the combat circumstances affecting the
force." [Ref. 8: p. 81] The QJM OE factors are mobility, posture, vulnerability, fatigue,
surprise, air superiority, terrain, weather, and season [Ref 8: p. 87].
a. Reasonableness of the Operational and Environmental factors
At this juncture, the reader may recall that force strength (S) incorporates
several of the OE factors (terrain, weather, season, and air superiority) under the name
weapon effects (V). However, weapon effect factors (V) are applied only to specific
weapon systems, whereas OE factors are apphed to entire forces. The OE factors, with
the exception of fatigue, are quantified through table lookups and formulae [Ref 9: p.
33].
The following example illustrates how the OE factors are employed in the
QJM. The example data is for a hypothetical battle.
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Example 8
OE FACTOR NOTATION VALUE
terrain TD 1.5
weather w 0.9
season se 1. 1
mobility mo 1. 1
posture POS 1.3
vulnerability VL 0.6
Calculation of Operational/Environmental (OE):
OE = TD xw X se X mo X POS xF=1.5x.9xl. lxl.lxl.3x.6=1.27
Discussion: The QJM OE factor is 1.27. This value (OE = 1.27) is used
in the Combat Power equation P - S x OE x CE to obtain P. The OE, along
with CE , acts as a proportionality constant in the Combat Power equation
by modifying the effects of weapons.
C. SUMMARY
The objective of the chapter was to determine if the QJM equations are reasonable
and if they adequately and accurately represent historic ground combat. The QJM
equations and their components (termed factors) were analyzed for reasonableness and
are summarized as follo\^'s:
1. Summary of the QJM Equations
• Actual Battle Results Equation (R): R acts as a report card which grades
adversaries, after the battle, in three categories (or factors) VI, G, and C. The
equation is reasonable, since the concept of additivity supports the contention that
forces strive to maximize R.
• Theoretical Combat Power Equation (P'): Theoretical combat power (?) is
proportional to force strength (S). The factor OE is the proportionality constant.
P' quantifies the combat potential of a force in weapons (type and number) and
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operational environmental factors. Moreover, P' intentionally omits human
factors. The Theoretical Combat Power equation appears militarily reasonable.
• Actual Battle Results Ratio R(b)/R(r): The ratio is reasonable. The winning force
on the battlefield possesses a ratio greater than one. Likewise, the losing force
possesses a ratio of less than one.
• Theoretical Combat Po>ver Ratio P'(b)/P'(i): The ratio compares adversaries in
terms of force strength and operational 'environmental factors and omits human
quaUties (leadership, morale, training and so forth). The ratio is reasonable because
it reveals the theoretically superior force.
• Combat Effectiveness Equation (CE): The CE equation is defined as a force's actual
battle results ratio divided by its theoretical combat power ratio. The equation is
reasonable and states that forces' hold CE edges only when their actual battle
results ratio is greater than their theoretical combat power ratio.
• Combat Po^er Equation (P): P is equal to the product of three factors S. OE. and
CE. A force's combat power in historic combat is a function of its type and number
of weapons, environment, operational factors, and the fighting qualities of its
personnel. From a mihtary standpoint, the equation appears reasonable.
• Relative Combat Power Equation (RCP): The QJM combat power ratio is
algebraically inconsistent. Therefore, a Relative Combat Power equation was
derived to more accurately represent historic ground combat between opposing
forces.
2. Summary of the QJM Factors (M, S, G, C, and OE)
• Mission Accomplishment (M): M, an integer, is scaled from one to ten and
determined subjectively. The approach for obtaining M is reasonable. Finally, the
QJM Actual Battle Results equation, R = M + G + C, appears most sensitive to
changes in M.
• Force Strength (S): S is a function of three components: number and type of
weapons, weapon lethality, and operational/environmental factors. The QJM Force
Strength equation is reasonable from a military perspective.
• Ability to Gain or Hold Ground (G): The equation used to compute G is not
reasonable. A modified equation has been oflcred as an alternative.
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• Effectiveness when Casualties are Incurred (C): C, a dimensionless quantity, is a
function of casualties, military posture, force strength, force vulnerability, and
number of personnel. The Eflectiveness when Casualties are Incurred equation
seems reasonable.
• Operational and Environmental Factors (OE): The OE factors comprise mobility,
posture, vulnerability, fatigue, surprise, air superiority, terrain, weather, and
season. These factors are apphed to entire forces and are militarily reasonable.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
There are numerous techniques or methodologies for analyzing land combat and
they appear to fall into two major categories: qualitative analyses and quantitative
analyses. The thesis has focused on one methodology in the second category called the
Quantified Judgement Model (QJM). The QJM is used to examine past battles or
predict future battle outcomes. The thesis, however, focuses exclusively on describing
the QJM and applying it to historic ground combat.
The QJM is composed of two submodels whose interactions manifest such
battlefield intangibles as leadership, training, morale, experience, and chance luck. The
thesis tests the reasonableness of those submodels and investigates their sensitivity to
changes in the model parameters.
Exploration of the QJM's equations and their components (termed factors) revealed
that the model is generally sound and reasonable. However, the QJM combat power
ratio was found to be algebraically incorrect and a Relative Combat Power (RCPj
equation was derived to replace it. The RCP equation is defined as follows:
Blue Force: RCP(b) =
P'(b)
P'ir) ^
^'
P'ir)
P\b) ^ -
CE{b)
Red Force: RCP[r) = CE{r)
where:
b= blue force
r=red force
P' = theoretical combat power
CE = combat effectiveness
Figure 28. Relative Combat Power Equation
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Additionally, the Ability to Gain or Hold Ground equation seemed unreasonable from
a militar}' standpoint and a modified equation was again offered as a possible substitute.
What are the practical miUtary applications of the model? In the first place, a
mathematically correct QJM could be used to analyze the performance of combat units
in training exercises and actual combat operations. For example, several U.S. Marine
infantry' battahons could be matched, one at a time, against a specific adversary to
accomplish a specific mission. Each battahon could be looked at by the QJM in terms
of how they fought against that same opponent. Though each of the battalions are
similar in numbers of personnel and weapons, we should expect differences in their
performance. The QJM may help to identify unusually successful units, which could then
be studied to learn what makes them so effective.
The QJM is a novel approach to exploring historic ground combat. Trevor Dupuy
deserves great credit for his pioneering efforts and original thought. With additional
mathematical refinement and verification, the QJM should prove to be a useful model
for studying combat.
B. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The following topics concerning the QJM are highly recommended for future
research:
• That the Force Strength (S) equation undergo a thorough dimensional analysis for
reasonableness.
• That the QJM's secondary equations (such as. vulnerability, mobility, range factor,
punishment factor and so forth) also be tested for reasonableness and that they
undergo a thorough dimensional analysis [Ref 9].
• That specific factors (such as, terrain, weather, and season) are applied twice to
individual forces (once to the entire force and then again to the eight individual
weapon types). This double counting should be examined for reasonableness.
• That the tabular QJM factors also be tested for reasonableness (to include
ahernative scaling techniques) and sensitivity [Ref 9: pp. 228-231].
That a readable QJM Users Manual be developed for military analysts desirmg to
study historic ground combat.
That a well documented military operation (such as. the U.S. invasion of Grenada)
be analyzed through the QJM and the results tested for reasonableness.
•
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